Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)-i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world-is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so-called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate.
The Question
Socrates, therefore, has both essential properties and an essence. The former are properties he has in every world in which he exists; the latter meets this condition and in addition is instantiated in any given world by Socrates or nothing. Of course not nearly all of Socrates' properties are essential to him and not nearly every property unique to him is one of his essences; but then it follows that Socrates exists in many possible worlds. Initially, this supposition seems harmless enough; it is natural enough to suppose that the same individual exists in various different states of affairs. There is, for example, the state of affairs consisting in Socrates' being a carpenter; this state of affairs is possible but does not in fact obtain. It is natural to suppose, however, that if it had obtained, then Socrates would have existed and would have been a carpenter; one plausibly supposes it impossible that this state of affairs obtain and Socrates fail to exist. If so, however, then Socrates exists in this state of affairs. But of course if he exists in this state of affairs, then he exists in every possible world including it. For clearly every possible world including Socrates' being a carpenter also includes Socrates' existing; each such world is such that if it had been actual, Socrates would have existed. So Socrates exists in many possible worlds.
At any rate, as I said, it is natural to make this supposition; but it is rejected by many philosophers otherwise kindly disposed towards possible worlds. Among them, there is, for example, Leibniz, whose credentials on this subject are certainly impeccable; Leibniz apparently held that each object exists in just one world. The idealists, furthermore, in arguing for their doctrine of internal relations, were arguing in essence that an object exists in exactly one possible world-indeed, some of them may have thought that there is only one such world. More recently, the view that individuals are thus confined to one worldlet us call it 'The Theory of Worldbound Individuals'-has been at least entertained with considerable hospitality by David Kaplan. Roderick Chisholm, furthermore, finds difficulty and perplexity in the claim that the same object exists in more than one possible world. Still further, The Theory of Worldbound Individuals is an explicit postulate of David Lewis's Counterpart Theory. In this chapter I shall explore this issue. Now perhaps the most important and widely heralded argument for the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (hereafter TWI) is the celebrated PROBLEM OF TRANSWORLD IDENTITY, said to bedevil the view that the same object exists in more than one world. Accordingly these two topics will occupy centre stage: TWI and the problem of Transworld Identity.
Socrates in α and Socrates in W
What then, can be said in favour of the idea that an individual is confined to just one world-that you and I, for example, exist in this world and this world only? According to G. E. Moore, the idealists, in arguing for their view that all relations are internal, were really arguing that all relational properties are essential to the things that have them. The argument they gave, however, if both sound and plausible, establishes that all properties-not just relational properties-are thus essential to their owners. And if this is correct then for no object x is there a possible state of affairs in which x lacks a property that in fact it has; so x exists only in the actual world.
Now an argument for a conclusion as sweeping as this must pack quite a punch. What did the idealists come up with? A confusion, says Moore. What the idealists asserted is (1) 'If P be a relational property and A a term to which it does in fact belong, then, no matter what P and A may be, it may always be truly asserted of them, that any term which had not possessed P would necessarily have been other than, numerically different from, A.. . . '
Perhaps we may put this more perspicuously as (1′) For any object x and relational property P, if x has P, then for any object y, if there is a world in which y lacks P, then y is distinct from x which clearly entails the desired conclusion that all relational properties are essential to their bearers. What they suggested as a reason for accepting (1), however, is (2) "If A has P, and x does not, it does follow that x is other than A."
If we restate (2) as the claim that (2′) For any objects x and y, if x has P and y does not, then x is distinct from y holds in every world, we see that (2) 
The Problem of Transworld Identity

A. The Problem Stated
A more popular and more promising argument for TWI is an appeal to the Problem of Transworld Identity said to confront one who rashly supposes the same object to exist in more than one world. Here the claim is that there are deep conceptual difficulties in identifying the same object from world to worlddifficulties that threaten the very idea of Transworld Identity with incoherence. These difficulties, furthermore, presumably do not arise on TWI. But what, exactly, is the problem of Transworld Identity?
What difficulties does it present for the notion that the same object exists in various possible worlds? Just how does this problem go? Although published statements of it are scarce, the problem may perhaps be put as follows. Let us suppose again that Socrates exists in some world W distinct from this one-a world in which, let us say, he fought in the battle of Marathon. In W, of course, he may also lack other properties he has in this world-perhaps in W he eschewed philosophy, corrupted no youth, and thus escaped the wrath of the Athenians. Perhaps in W he lived in Corinth, let us say, was six feet tall, and remained a bachelor all his life. But then we must ask ourselves how we could possibly identify Socrates in that world. How could we pick him out? How could we locate him there? How could we possibly tell which of the many things contained in W is Socrates? If we try to employ the properties we use to identify him in this world, our efforts may well end in dismal failure-perhaps in that world it is Xenophon or maybe even Thrasymachus who is Plato's mentor and exhibits the splendidly singleminded passion for truth and justice that characterizes Socrates in this. But if we cannot identify him in W, so the argument continues, then we do not really understand the assertion that he exists there. If we cannot even identify him, we would not know whom we were talking about, in saying that Socrates exists in that world or has this or that property therein. In order to make sense of such talk, we must have a criterion or principle that enables us to identify Socrates from world to world. This criterion must consist in some property that Socrates has in each world in which he exists-and if it is to be sufficient to enable us to pick him out in a given world, distinguish him from other things, it must be a property that in no possible world is exemplified by something distinct from Socrates. Further, the property (or properties) in question, if it is to enable us thus to pick him out, must be, in some broad sense, 'empirically manifest': it must resemble such properties as having such-and-such a name, address, social security number, height, weight, and general appearance in that we can tell by broadly empirical means whether a given object has or lacks it. For how, otherwise, could we use it to pick out or identify him? So if it is intelligible to suppose that Socrates exists in more than one world, there must be some empirically manifest property that he and he alone has in each of the worlds in which he exists. Now obviously we do not know of any such property, or even that there is such a property. Indeed, it is hard to see how there could be such a property. But then the very idea of Transworld Identity is not really intelligible-in which case we must suppose that no object exists in more than one world.
The first thing to note is that this objection seems to arise out of a certain picture or image. We imagine ourselves somehow peering-through a Jules Verne-oscope, perhaps-into another world; we ask ourselves whether Socrates exists in it. We observe the behaviour and characteristics of its denizens and then wonder which of these, if any, is Socrates. Here the argument is manifestly confused. To suppose that Cantor was a precocious baby at t it is not necessary that I be able to pick his picture out of a gallery of babies-at-t. Perhaps I must know who he is to understand this supposition; and perhaps to know that I must know of some property that he and he alone has. Indeed, we might go so far as to concede that this property must be 'empirically manifest' in some sense. But surely it is asking too much to require that I know of such a property that he and he only has at every time at which he exists. No doubt I must be able to answer the question 'which of the things that existed at t was Cantor?' but the answer is easy enough; it is Cantor himself. If this is correct, however, why suppose otherwise in the transworld case?
But perhaps the temporal analogy is not altogether convincing. "After all", it may be said, "times are linearly ordered; and at any times t and t′ such that the interval between the two is small, there will indeed be some empirically manifest property that Cantor and Cantor alone has both at t and at t′. Indeed, the objection continues, "this fact is a necessary condition of our being able to identify an object x at a time t′ as the same object that existed at an earlier time t; and this ability to reidentify objects is a necessary condition of our intelligibly supposing that the same object exists at various distinct times. Nothing like this is available in the transworld case." Of course the objector is partly right; there is this difference between the transtemporal and transworld situations. I do not see, however, that this point invalidates the analogy. But let us focus our attention directly upon the transworld situation. The picture suggests that all of the possible worlds (W included) are somehow simultaneously "going on"-as if each world were actual, but at a different place or perhaps (as the best science fiction has it) in a "different dimension". It also suggests that I must be able to look into W and sift through its inhabitants until I run across one I recognize as Socrates-otherwise I cannot identify him, and hence do not know whom I am talking about. But here the picture misleads us. For taken literally, of course, this notion makes no sense. There is no such thing as "looking into" another possible world to see what is going on there. There is no such thing as inspecting the inhabitants of another possible world with a view to deciding which, if any, is Socrates. A possible world is a possible state of affairs. In saying that an individual x exists or has a property P in a state of affairs S we are pointing to the impossibility that S obtain and x fail to exist or fail to have P. So, for example, consider the state of affairs consisting in Socrates' being a carpenter, and call this state of affairs 'S'. Does Socrates exist in S? Obviously: had this state of affairs been actual, he would have existed. But is there a problem of identifying, him, picking him out, in S-that is, must we look into S to see which thing therein is Socrates? Must there be or must we know of some empirically manifest property he has in this and every other state of affairs in which he exists? Surely not.
We might define existence in a proposition analogously to existence in a state of affairs; that is, we might say that an object x exists in a proposition p if and only if it is not possible that p be true and x fail to exist; and we might define 'x has property P in p' in appropriately similar fashion. Then clearly enough both Quine and Royal Robbins exist in the proposition (5) Quine is America's foremost rock-climber and Royal Robbins is America's most distinguished philosopher.
But must we 'identify' Robbins and Quine in (5) in order to grasp or understand it? … Must we be apprised of some empirically manifest property Quine alone has in every proposition in which he exists in order to understand (5)? Of course not; there is no such property and the request for one is surely based upon nothing but confusion. 
Objections to TWI
The arguments for the Theory of Worldbound Individuals, then, are based upon error and confusion; but are there positive reasons for rejecting this theory? It certainly seems so. The theory's basic thrust is that no object exists in more than one possible world; this implies the outrageous view that-taking 'property' in as wide a sense as you like-no object could have lacked any property that in fact it has. Had the world been different in even the tiniest, most irrelevant fashion, Socrates would not have existed. On this theory, if God created both Socrates and n electrons, then it was absolutely impossible that he create both Socrates and n + 1 electrons. TWI thereby fails to distinguish the relation in which Socrates stands to inconsistent attributes-being both married and unmarried, for example-from the relationship in which he stands to such an attribute as fleeing to Thebes or being such that there are n + 1 electrons. It is as impossible, on this view, that Socrates should have had the latter as the former. Every attribute of Socrates is one that he has in every world in which he exists-there being only one such world; so no attribute he lacks is such that there is a possible state of affairs in which he has it. Accordingly, on this view each of Socrates' properties is essential to him.
Consider, furthermore, a proposition like (6) Socrates is foolish, a proposition which predicates of Socrates a property he lacks. Now presumably (6) is true, in a given possible world, only if Socrates exists in that world and has the property of being foolish therein. But on TWI there is no such world; accordingly, (6) 
Counterpart Theory
But here we must consider an exciting new wrinkle to this old theory. Embracing the Theory of Worldbound Individuals, David Lewis adds to it the suggestion that a worldbound individual typically has counterparts in other possible worlds:
The counterpart relation is our substitute for identity between things in different worlds. Where some would say that you are in several worlds, in which you have somewhat different properties and somewhat different things happen to you, I prefer to say that you are in the actual world and no other, but you have counterparts in several other worlds. Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. For each of them is in his own world, and only you are here in the actual world. Indeed we might say, speaking casually, that your counterparts are you in other worlds, that they and you are the same; but this sameness is no more a literal identity than the sameness between you today and you tomorrow. It would be better to say that your counterparts are men you would have been, had the world been otherwise.
Fortified with Counterpart Theory, TWI seems no longer obliged to hold that each of Socrates' properties is essential to him; instead, a property is essential to him if and only if each of his counterparts (among whom is Socrates himself) has it: "In short, an essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. All your counterparts are probably human; if so, you are essentially human" (ibid., p. 122). So while indeed there is no world in which Socrates, our Socrates-the object that in our world is Socrates-lacks the property of being snubnosed, there are no doubt worlds containing counterparts of Socrates-counterparts that are not snubnosed. Hence the property of being snubnosed is not essential to him. …
